Intelligence Research

Başlatan Karabasan, Tem 13, 2019, 12:04 ÖÖ

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IT IS THE size of a small suitcase and can be placed discreetly in the back of a car. When the device is powered up, it begins secretly monitoring hundreds of cellphones in the vicinity, recording people's private conversations and vacuuming up their text messages.

The device is one of several spy tools manufactured by a Chinese company called Semptian, which has supplied the equipment to authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, according to two sources with knowledge of the company's operations.

As The Intercept first reported on Thursday, since 2015, Semptian has been using American technology to help build more powerful surveillance and censorship equipment, which it sells to governments under the guise of a front company called iNext.

Semptian is collaborating with IBM and leading U.S. chip manufacturer Xilinx to advance a breed of microprocessors that enable computers to analyze vast amounts of data more quickly. The Chinese firm is a member of an American organization called the OpenPower Foundation, which was founded by Google and IBM executives with the aim of trying to "drive innovation."

Semptian, Google, and Xilinx did not respond to requests for comment. The OpenPower Foundation said in a statement that it "does not become involved, or seek to be informed, about the individual business strategies, goals or activities of its members," due to antitrust and competition laws. An IBM spokesperson said that his company "has not worked with Semptian on joint technology development," and refused to answer further questions.

Semptian's equipment is helping China's ruling Communist Party regime covertly monitor the internet and cellphone activity of up to 200 million people across the East Asian country, sifting through vast amounts of private data every day.

But the company's reach extends far beyond China. In recent years, it has been marketing its technologies globally.

After receiving tips from confidential sources about Semptian's role in mass surveillance, a reporter contacted the company using an assumed name and posing as a potential customer. In emails, a Semptian representative confirmed that the company had provided its surveillance tools to security agencies in the Middle East and North Africa -- and said it had fitted a mass surveillance system in an unnamed country, creating a digital dragnet across its entire population.

The mass surveillance system, named Aegis, is designed to monitor phone and internet use. It can "store and analyze unlimited data" and "show the connections of everyone," according to documents provided by the company.

"We have installed Aegis in other countries [than China] and covered the whole country," stated Semptian's Zhu Wenying in an April email. He declined to provide names of the countries where the equipment has been installed, saying it was "highly sensitive, we are under very strict [nondisclosure agreement]."

Similar equipment has been used for years by Western intelligence agencies and police. However, thanks in part to companies like Semptian, the technology is increasingly finding its way into the hands of security forces in undemocratic countries where dissidents are jailed, tortured, and in some cases executed.

"We've seen regular and shocking examples of how surveillance is being used by governments around the world to stay in power by targeting activists, journalists, and opposition members," said Gus Hosein, executive director of London-based human rights group Privacy International. "Industry is selling the whole stack of surveillance capability at the network, service, city, and state levels. Chinese firms appear to be the latest entrants into this competitive market of influence and data exploitation."

Asked whether there were any countries it would refuse to deal with in the Middle East and North Africa, Zhu wrote that Iran and Syria were the only two places that were off limits. The company was apparently willing to work with other countries in the region -- such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Sudan, and Egypt -- where governments routinely abuse human rights, cracking down on freedom of speech and peaceful protest.

Documents show that Semptian is currently offering governments the opportunity to purchase four different systems: Aegis, Owlet, HawkEye, and Falcon.

Aegis, Semptian's flagship system, is designed to be installed inside phone and internet networks, where it is used to secretly collect people's email records, phone calls, text messages, cellphone locations, and web browsing histories. Governments in most countries have the power to legally compel phone and internet providers to install such equipment.

Semptian claims that Aegis offers "a full view to the virtual world," enabling government spies to see "location information for everyone in the country." It can also "block certain information [on the] internet from being visited," censoring content that governments do not want their citizens to see.

The Owlet and Falcon devices are smaller scale; they are portable and focus only on cellphone communications. They are the size of a suitcase and can be operated from a vehicle, for example, or from an apartment overlooking a city square.

When the Owlet device is activated, it begins tapping into cellphone calls and text messages that are being transmitted over the airwaves in the immediate area. Semptian's documents state that the Owlet has the capacity to monitor 200 different phones at any one time.

"Massive interception is used to intercept voice and SMS around the system within the coverage range," states a document describing Owlet. It adds that there is an "SMS keyword filtering" feature, suggesting that authorities can target people based on particular phrases or words they mention in their messages.

The Falcon system, unlike Owlet, does not have the capability to eavesdrop on calls or texts. Instead, it is designed to track the location of targeted cellphones over an almost 1-mile radius and can pinpoint them to within 5 meters, similar in function to a device known as a Stingray, used by U.S. law enforcement.

When Falcon is powered up, it will "force all nearby mobile phones and other cellular data devices to connect to it," and can help government authorities "find out the exact house which the targets [are] hiding in," according to Semptian's documents.

Falcon comes equipped with a smaller, pocket-size device that can be used by a government agent to pursue people on foot, tracking down the location of their cellphones to within 1 meter.

The fourth system Semptian sells to governments, HawkEye, is a portable, camera-based platform that incorporates facial recognition technology. It is designed to be placed in any location to create a "temporary surveillance scene," the company's documents say.

HawkEye scans people as they walk past the camera and compares images of their faces to photographs contained in "multi-million-level databases" in real time, triggering an alert if a particular suspect is identified.

Zhu, the Semptian employee, wrote that some of these tools had been provided to authorities in the Middle East and North Africa region, known as MENA. "Aegis, Falcon and HawkEye are our new solutions for [law enforcement agency] users," wrote Zhu. "All the three products have successful stories and some in MENA."

Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a policy think tank, said that Semptian's exports appear to fit with a broader trend, which has seen Chinese companies export surveillance and censorship technologies in an effort to tap into new markets while also promoting China ideologically.

"The Chinese Communist Party seeks to bolster and support regimes that are not unlike itself," Kania said. "It is deeply concerning, because we are seeing rapid diffusion of technologies that, while subject to abuses in democracies, are even more problematic in regimes where there aren't checks and balances and an open civil society."
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A Spy Case Exposes China's Power Play in Central Asia

In a top-secret operation earlier this year, Kazakh counterintelligence officers swooped in on a Soviet-era apartment block and detained a senior government adviser on charges of spying for China.

Months later, the authorities did something unusual. They allowed information about the case to leak in local media, a rare instance of open push back against Beijing's growing influence in Central Asia's largest and richest country.

The arrest of Konstantin Syroyezhkin--a former Soviet KGB agent accused of passing classified documents to Chinese agents, according to people with knowledge of the investigation--comes as Kazakhstan's leaders struggle to balance a hunger for Chinese investment with fears of encroachment by their giant eastern neighbor.

"By making this story public, the Kazakhs are sending China a message--not to get too bold in Kazakhstan or go too far," said Vasily Kashin, a China expert at Moscow's Higher School of Economics.

For decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan's leaders have tried to juggle relationships with the West along with ties to their old paymasters in Moscow. But in recent years China has emerged as a new and powerful player in what is now a three-way balancing act.

Kazakhstan's new president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, elected last month after being tapped by longtime leaderNursultan Nazarbayev as his successor, has pledged to maintain the equilibrium among Chinese, Russian and Western interests. Mr. Tokayev is fluent in Russian, Chinese and English.

In a recent interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Tokayev described China as an important strategic partner. "We enjoy a very close relationship in the economic area," he said. "At the same time, we're developing our political cooperation.

But the arrest of Mr. Syroyezhkin, one of the former Soviet Union's foremost China experts, on espionage charges exposes Kazakhstan's growing unease over China's clout, and its deepening sense of vulnerability sitting at the crossroads of Asia.

The country stretches from China's western border to the easternmost reaches of Europe. It was here that Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the launch of his country's Belt and Road Initiative in 2013.

China was one of Kazakhstan's top investors last year, and people close to the government say loans from Chinese state banks and lending institutions to the Kazakh state have skyrocketed to tens of billions of dollars. But now Kazakh officials say China is trying to take advantage of those economic ties to boost its political influence, and they are trying to impose some boundaries.

The Kazakh Foreign Ministry has said China is an important partner in the Central Asian country's attempt to balance relations with Russia and the West, but a spokesman wasn't available to comment on whether China was taking advantage of its growing clout.

China's Foreign Ministry didn't immediately respond to a request for comment.

"China's presence in Kazakhstan, the investments they're making, it's become a divisive issue, and fears are growing that they're getting too powerful," said Ruslan Izimov, a China expert at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the capital of Nur-Sultan, which advises the Kazakh government.

Among other things, Beijing recently lobbied Kazakhstan's government to allow Chinese security contractors to operate in Kazakh territory, according to one person with knowledge of the negotiations, a thought anathema to the Kazakh security services.

In some instances, Chinese businessmen have demanded holdings in Kazakh companies to keep up the flow of loans for big projects, the same person said. It is unclear how the negotiations progressed.

China responded to the allegation that Mr. Syroyezhkin spied for Beijing by describing it as a "piece of news created out thin air," a foreign ministry official said.

The U.S. presence in Central Asia has faded. Moscow has tried, with limited success, to counter Chinese economic influence by exercising its longstanding political ties to the former Soviet state, but even Russian officials privately say they feel their influence in Kazakhstan waning.

The case against Mr. Syroyezhkin could serve as a warning shot. It is likely to be popular in Kazakhstan, where analysts say anti-Chinese sentiment is growing among some parts of the population because of China's harsh crackdown on Muslim Uighurs directly across the border in China's northwestern Xinjiang region.

As many as a million Uighurs have been forced into re-education and labor camps, which doesn't sit well with Kazakhs, many of whom share cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the Uighurs. Some ethnic Kazakhs have also been interned in the camps. Nationwide protests in 2016 forced the Kazakh government to abandon plans to sell land to Chinese.

"The government right now doesn't want to publicize its ties with China, because it's a sensitive issue," said Mr. Izimov, the China expert at Kazakhstan's Institute of World Economics and Politics.

President Tokayev in his interview rejected suggestions that anti-Chinese sentiment was widespread, dismissing it as a relic of the past.

Yet while commercial ties with China are flourishing, accounting for a 12% of Kazakhstan's total trade and growing, a chill has slowed some of the larger state-backed Chinese-funded projects, including plans for a light-rail system in the capital. A separate $27 billion investment program between Chinese and Kazakh companies has all but collapsed.

The case against Mr. Syroyezhkin, who holds both Kazakh and Russian citizenship, threatens to strain relations further. He was arrested on Feb. 19 in his hometown, Almaty.

People with knowledge of the investigation say it revolves around accusations that he passed secret documents to people associated with Chinese intelligence. Others familiar with the investigation say Mr. Syroyezhkin might also have received cash as payment.

In his role as a top adviser on relations with China, he counseled Mr. Tokayev, who was then prime minister, on negotiations with Chinese officials over the demarcation of the Kazakh-Chinese border. Mr. Syroyezhkin has written extensively on China and was considered one of the foremost experts on Beijing in the former Soviet Union.

Kazakhstan's security agency couldn't be reached for comment. Mr. Syroyezhkin and his defense team also couldn't be reached.

China runs extensive espionage and intelligence-gathering operations across Asia, Europe and the U.S., where Chinese agents have used offers of cash and other rewards to recruit Americans to spy for them.

U.S. courts have convicted people of acting as agents for China, and Beijing has also run intelligence operations in Russia, a country it considers a strategic partner. In Russia and Kazakhstan, semiofficial Chinese think tanks play a role in reaching out to people viewed as potential assets, followed by requests for information and promises of cash.

"It's a standard practice for them when working to recruit agents, and it works in Kazakhstan as well as anywhere else," said Mr. Kashin, the China expert at Moscow's Higher School of Economics.
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Kevin Carroll

China is engaged in an organized effort to mass-produce counterfeit goods for resale abroad. This counterfeiting and copyright and trademark infringement harms America's business owners, consumers, inventors, investors, and workers. China's campaign of theft simultaneously seeks to obtain U.S. military technology to gain a decisive material advantage in a future armed conflict. To fight back, the U.S. government should allow American plaintiffs suffering intellectual property misappropriation and infringement by foreigners to file suit in the legal jurisdiction of Washington, D.C. if the copyrights, trade secrets, or patents in question are subject to defense export controls.

Trade talks between Beijing and Washington are at an impasse, and the related issue of Chinese theft of American intellectual property remains unresolved, with the United States requesting hundreds of changes to Chinese law on this topic, according to China. What if President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump ultimately cannot reach agreement on this issue?

As diplomats negotiate, the theft of intellectual property continues. The 2015 agreement between President Barack Obama and President Xi regarding economic cyberespionage against commercial targets appears to have reduced theft somewhat, but a senior U.S. intelligence official stated in 2018 that China continues to violate aspects of the accord.

In 2017, President Trump released Executive Order 13773, which tasked the administration and the U.S. intelligence community with determining the impact of transnational organized crime, including intellectual property theft, on the United States. The resulting report, which was not made public, revealed a significant impact on American prosperity and serious distortions of the U.S. economy from intellectual property theft. Overall losses from intellectual property theft alone -- much of which is attributable to China -- are as much as $600 billion a year, nearly equivalent to the gross domestic product of Switzerland. Similarly, malicious cyber activity alone cost between $57 billion and $109 billion in 2016, according to the Council of Economic Advisers.

While many countries engage in cyberespionage for commercial purposes, including U.S. allies, America's defense industrial base is a primary target of China's campaign of theft, which presents a special danger. A dramatic U.S. Navy report earlier this year asserted that China derives from cyberespionage "an incalculable near- and long-term military advantage… altering the calculus of global power." Businesses and universities that work with the Navy are under attack, as well. A senior official described the Navy as "under siege. People think it's much like a deathly virus -- if we don't do anything, we could die." An executive of cybersecurity firm FireEye aptly described this Chinese hacking as "preparation for great power conflict."

Despite the significant national security impact of intellectual property theft and cyberespionage, federal penalties for these crimes are minimal compared to those for other serious crimes, such as narcotics trafficking or terrorism. Copyright infringement, computer fraud, and trade secret theft carry maximum sentences of one to ten years, whereas drug and terror crimes routinely and appropriately result in decades-long sentences. For example, in March, two Baltimore drug dealers received sentences of thirty years and life in prison, respectively, and in June, a New York City man received a sentence of twenty years for attempting to join the Islamic State.

U.S. laws have not kept up with the pace of technology or with adversaries' use of intellectual property theft as an instrument of national strategy. For example, neither computer fraud nor the violation of digital copyrights can form the basis of a prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, and the law authorizing wiretaps in criminal investigations does not provide for warrants to discover evidence of intellectual property theft.

Fixing these intellectual property issues in current trade negotiations may prove out of reach. A comprehensive trade deal encompassing both the issue of intellectual property theft and the $419 billion annual trade imbalance will be difficult to reach. The United States may lack sufficient leverage to exert its will on China for reasons of neglect decades in the making. It will remain so until the United States repairs its public finances, eliminates or accepts North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's nuclear arms and intercontinental missiles, and rebuilds naval assets needed by Indo-Pacific Command's Third and Seventh Fleets.

Economically, politically, and militarily, America's strength vis-a-vis China is at a low ebb. China holds over $1 trillion in U.S. federal debt, while the projected U.S. federal budget deficit for 2019 is $910 billion and rising. Beijing's diplomatic assistance is key to Washington's ongoing efforts to denuclearize China's neighbor and client, North Korea. The 289-ship U.S. Navy is both smaller than China's 400-ship navy and stretched farther afield, with responsibilities in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans along with several seas, rather than just the western Pacific.

As a result of the power imbalance and the complexity of the deal, a broad economic agreement encompassing both trade and intellectual property may be impossible to reach. But that does not mean that the United States must fail to address the issue of intellectual property theft: It can and should act unilaterally to do so.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community lack experience in civil litigation, while the civil division of the Justice Department lacks the inclination or resources to pursue complex and long-term lawsuits in the area of cyberespionage. With cybersecurity and law enforcement measures clearly insufficient to deter or defeat Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft against U.S. victims, America's business community and private practice law community need to enter this fight. The U.S. government should remove the obstacle standing in their way.

Under current federal law, any suit alleging patent or copyright infringement must be filed in the judicial district in which the defendant resides, or in the district where they committed infringement and have a regular place of business. This makes sense for garden-variety commercial disputes between American businesses. It usefully prevents "venue shopping" for plaintiff-friendly districts, in which lawyers seeking to pursue claims find reasons to file them in pro-plaintiff jurisdictions.

However, the current geography-based structure for intellectual property lawsuits makes little sense in cases wherein Americans are burgled by foreign companies acting as government proxies executing national policy. Intellectual property theft by old-fashioned burglary may happen abroad or the theft may take place online via a keystroke in Shanghai by the Third People's Liberation Army's Unit 61398 and parastatal actors. Yet most foreign courts are unlikely to be fair venues for American civil plaintiffs seeking to be made whole by pursuing politically sensitive claims, especially those involving defense technology.

This is especially true in China. While some progress has been made recently, and some Chinese provincial jurisdictions appear to be fairer to foreign civil litigants than others, damages for intellectual property theft under Chinese law are still limited, and in the end, Chinese judges report to the Chinese Communist Party. As a 2018 report by the United States Trade Representative put it, notwithstanding recent positive developments, "China remains a hazardous and uncertain environment for U.S. right holders hoping to protect and enforce their IP rights," as "interventions by local government officials, powerful local interests, and the Chinese Communist Party remain obstacles to the independence of the courts and rule of law."

To help counteract the Chinese threat, the U.S. government should amend the relevant statute -- Section 1400, Title 28, of the U.S. Code. American plaintiffs who suffer intellectual property theft should be allowed to file suit in the District of Columbia if the defendant's business is located outside of the United States and the infringed copyrights or patents are integral to articles subject to the Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Haul foreign civil parties into U.S. District Court, where plaintiffs and defendants of any nationality receive fair treatment.

The administration cannot implement this proposal alone; it will require a legislative fix. President Trump and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell would have to reach across the aisle to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to get this done. But protecting Americans from intellectual property theft should not be a partisan issue. While some American lawyers who represent foreign defendants in intellectual property theft cases will be displeased, both parties' leaders and voters are already displeased with China's activities and would likely be supportive of the proposed change.

Intellectual property suits against foreigners will still present challenges, even in U.S. federal courts. Civil defendants based in foreign jurisdictions may still hide or destroy evidence, try to bury plaintiffs under mountains of non-responsive foreign-language documents (which need to be translated and reviewed at great expense), or seek to avoid paying judgments. Some bad actors may remain over the horizon and beyond the reach of American law. But other foreign companies that notoriously act on behalf of Chinese intelligence often have subsidiaries to sue and attachable assets to seize in the United States, rendering some cases against them worth bringing, in economic terms.

Americans ought to be allowed to play this tough game on their home field. The U.S. government should give the American business community and the private bar a tool to take up this important fight on behalf of fellow citizens and servicemembers.

Kevin Carroll served as a Senior Counselor to Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, and earlier as a CIA and Army officer. Mesajı Paylaş
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Pentagon Announces New Digital Modernization Strategy

The Defense Department this week published a multi-pronged digital modernization strategy targeting four areas that can benefit most from a new approach to the digital age: a Pentagon-wide data storage cloud; artificial intelligence; command, control, and communications; and cybersecurity.

Across dozens of objectives, the strategy encompasses current and future efforts like those underway at the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and in iterative software coding centers to fuel innovative technologies, as well as to make the Pentagon's information technology enterprise more efficient and capable, boost network security, and cultivate a digital-savvy workforce. Mesajı Paylaş
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Tem 17, 2019, 07:03 ÖS Last Edit: Tem 17, 2019, 07:10 ÖS by Southwater
Intel işinin makinalara, analistlere devri 70'li yıllardan itibaren tartışılan bir konu.
Angleton ve Intelci bir amiral (ismini unuttum şimdi) yamulmuyorsam bu işin öncüsü.
Ama sonra İran'da devrim oluyor ve bakıyorlar ki sahayı bilen operatörleri yok veya çok az.
HumInt her dem önemli kalacak bence.
Tech geliştikçe İKK da gelişecek, ama honey her zaman yapışkan olacak veya para her zaman akılları alacak.

Ekle= Stansfield Turner amiralin adı. Mesajı Paylaş


Americans reported hearing torturous sounds in Cuba--and now their brains seem changed

Beginning in late 2016, government officials from the United States and Canada stationed in Cuba started reporting clusters of symptoms that seemed a bit like a concussion: a sudden onset of headaches, dizziness, and confusion after hearing a high pitched noise. The illness soon became referred to as "Havana syndrome" and the cause has been subject to intense debate, and some experts have suggested that the condition is purely psychological. But a new study, which found that those affected have differences in their brains compared to healthy people, pushes back on that skepticism.

The research builds on a previous study from the same research team outlining the neurological problems experienced by people who lived in Cuba and who reported symptoms. "This is the imaging findings that underlie those clinical symptoms," says study author Ragini Verma, a professor of radiology and a brain imaging specialist at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.

The new study, published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), used brain scans to look at three different aspects of brain function in 40 people who were clinically evaluated after reported exposure to the as-yet undetermined phenomenon. It looked at the overall volume of various regions in their brains; at the fine structure of brain tissue in the cerebellum, which regulates movement and controls balance; and at the connectivity of brain networks involved in hearing, vision, and high-level cognitive skills like memory.

The authors selected those brain regions and networks based on the observed clinical symptoms, Verma says. "It seemed like there should be something wrong in the cerebellum, and that helped form our hypothesis," she says. Patients in the study also reported visual, auditory, and memory problems.

Images from the brains of those patients were compared with two control groups who had different educational backgrounds. "The first was matched to this population, with at least a college degree, good motor skills, and jobs that require multitasking. The second was a traditional traumatic brain injury control group," Verma says. The team was not able to build a control group of unaffected government personnel also stationed in Cuba, which is a limitation of the analysis, says Dorina Papageorgiou, a neuroimaging specialist at Baylor College of Medicine. They also didn't have scans available for patients from before symptoms started, which would have allowed them to have an established baseline for each person and thus pinpoint changes case-by-case.

The analysis found that the patients who had been stationed in Cuba had less volume of white matter, which contains the parts of neurons that connect brain regions together, than the control groups. They had differences in their cerebellum to the control groups, and had lower connectivity in the auditory and visual networks of the brain (though not those involved in executive function).

Notably, Verma says, the patterns of changes in brain volume and in the cerebellum, were unlike the patterns of changes seen in any other diseases--they didn't look like the changes seen in patients with traumatic brain injuries, for example, or other neurological conditions.

"To the best of my knowledge, this is something unique to these patients," she says. Seeing a new pattern, she says, is extremely rare.

The findings do indicate, though, that there are structural and functional changes in the brain that offer a potential basis for clinical symptoms. It's a counter to some criticisms levied on the team's prior paper that evaluated the neurological symptoms of this patient group, which included skepticism that their experiences weren't just psychogenic. "The clinical element said there should be a problem in the cerebellum, and the imaging showed changes in the cerebellum. It's an objective measure," Verma says.

However, it's not clear what the overall changes seen in this study mean clinically, for patient function, according to an accompanying editor's note also published in the JAMA. It's also not clear how significant the changes between the two groups are, says Gerard Gianoli, a neurotologist (someone who specializes in neurological disorders of the ear) at the Ear and Balance Institute in Louisiana. Gianoli says he's more convinced by a 2018 paper that showed inner ear damage in those affected. The new paper, though, still provides important data. "It's a part of the puzzle, and it adds a piece of information," he says.

The changes in these patients, both in the brain and in the inner ear, could be caused by multiple different things, Gianoli says--this research doesn't answer questions about the initial trigger. It may never be clear what happened, Verma says. "If you asked me, did something happen, I would say yes. But this doesn't tell us how or why." Mesajı Paylaş
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Pentagon Pumps Millions Into German Universities for Research - Reports

Although most German universities are allowed to conduct only non-military research, some of them have received grants from the US Department of Defence for projects with dual commercial and military purposes. These projects range from explosives to radar systems, as Der Spiegel found out.

German universities and research institutions have received $21.7 million in grants from the Pentagon since 2008, the German magazine Der Spiegel calculated after examining US budget data. According to the outlet, 260 such transfers have been registered with some of the universities repeatedly receiving financing from the US military. The support is mainly focused on technical and scientific disciplines.

Ludwig Maximilians University (LMU) in Munich is said to be the leading individual recipient, receiving nearly $3.7 million from the US Department of Defence since 2008 over 23 individual transfers. Additionally, it was the Bavarian university that was apparently paid the largest single grant when it received $1.72 million to finance a project, researching chemicals and possible replacements for an explosive called RDX, widely used in the military.

Other leading recipients are the Technichal University Darmstadt and RWTH Aachen, which has been given more than $1 million since 2008.

The outlet points to a contradiction with educational regulations, stating that universities should be committed to peaceful goals and fulfil their special responsibility for sustainable development, which some interpret as a clear requirement to reject military funding.

The corresponding clause was introduced in one German state, North Rhine-Westphalia, and remains in force despite discussions to abolish it. However, the data, studied by Der Spiegel, suggested that three universities there have been funded by the Pentagon since 2014: RWTH Aachen University, Ruhr University Bochum, and the University of Paderborn.

RWTH Aachen, when commenting on the matter expressed commitment to peaceful research and denied that it had conducted armaments research, saying its goal is to "be the academic foundation for sustainable solutions to respond to today's and tomorrow's civil challenges".

As Der Spiegel concludes, the problem is that a lot of research can be used for both militarily and civilian purposes, ranging from communications technology to robots and software, so accepting the US Department of Defence's funding is "a tightrope walk".

The US military, in several project descriptions, notes unambiguously that it is interested in basic research, which is "related to the improvement of army programs and operations or has such a potential". Other documents outline the objective of "maintaining technological superiority in the scientific fields relevant to the needs of the Air Force" as well as the goal of preventing "technological surprises for our nation", meaning the US, and develop such surprises "for our opponents".

Examples of such dual-purpose research include several projects at RWTH Aachen. The university, however, has defended its ventures, including a $530,000 grant for research called "A scalable and high-performance approach to the readout of silicon qubits" that explores important components of quantum computers. The university insisted in a statement that although it was initially driven by the ability to decrypt messages, economic usage is now in the foreground. Another project concerns stable power supply for ships, also funded by the Pentagon.

Despite receiving $300,000 from the US military, the university argues that it was "basic research that could be applied to any kind of ships". One of RWTH's projects developed textiles for military and commercial applications that are designed to repel insects using only physical agents without insecticides.

Non-university research institutes also were among US funding recipients with dual-use projects. The most generous grants have gone to the Max Planck Society, to the German Aerospace Centre, and to the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) for Polar and Marine Research in Bremerhaven. They included funding for an infrared-based automated whale detection project by AWI researchers, who received a total sum of $973,000. As the outlet points out, this could be used for hunting gigantic mammals as well as submarines. Mesajı Paylaş
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The Fog of Espionage, Part 1: Millions of spies target the US, creating unprecedented, existential threat --- 4 months ago

Daybreak slides westward across the time zones, slowly illuminating the world's cities, towns and remote villages. The sun burns off the mist of the darkness, bringing a new day into view.

But while daylight often betrays secrets of the night, the activities of a select group of actors remains concealed, protected by sophisticated, hidden organizations and expertly skilled operatives.

Sprinkled among the billions of men and women who rise from slumber and engage in their morning rituals each day are millions of members of a secret fraternity, their true identities and motives unknown even to their immediate families.

They are envoys of espionage -- spies. And their No. 1 target is the United States.

They scour the world using tools ranging from high-tech devices to the time-honored tactic of personal interaction, all in relentless pursuit of U.S. government, military and intelligence secrets -- and more.

Former Defense Intelligence Agency official Chris Simmons said, "On any given day, 2 to 3 million people worldwide are engaged in espionage."

Simmons worked in counterintelligence at DIA, where the job was to find and prevent spying against the U.S. He estimated that more than 100 "nations and other interests" are operating in this country.

Robert Baer, who worked covertly for 21 years in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia as CIA case officer running spies, believes the number of spies is even greater: "We're talking about 3 or 4 million."

Current U.S. government officials, and foreign intelligence officials and diplomats from a half-dozen countries, whom WTOP interviewed on the record and in background discussions, would not affix a number to the pool of active spies they believe are operating in the world. But all determined an alarming and rapidly escalating threat, eclipsing anything they've ever experienced, is at work.

Beijing's spies

Simmons said that of the 2 million to 3 million spies he estimates are active, he thinks about half work for the Chinese government.

Pete Lapp, a special agent at the Washington Field Office of the FBI, said that while he would not discuss numbers of Chinese operatives, "China by far is our preeminent counterintelligence threat."

Their most sought-after prize, however, extends beyond traditional espionage. Intellectual property from U.S. companies is now a top priority for many spies. "Infiltrating our industries to steal our innovation is a big, big problem."

FBI director Christopher Wray acknowledged as much in a 2018 speech at the Aspen Security Forum, saying the FBI has economic espionage investigations tracing back to China in all 50 states, covering "everything from corn seeds in Iowa to wind turbines in Massachusetts and everything in between."

Russian intelligence operatives are widely viewed as more sophisticated -- their country has a century-old tradition of dedicated espionage practices and doctrine, dating back to the Cheka in 1918.

But while not as skilled, Chinese spies are considered the most prolific threat because of their sheer number of operatives.

Nicholas Eftimiades, a top Chinese intelligence expert in U.S. intelligence circles, called China's method "a whole-of-society approach."

"Not only does it have the structured organizational components like the People Liberation Army and the Ministry of State Security and other entities," he added, "but the senior leadership in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China encourages espionage."

Eftimiades, a retired U.S. intelligence official who now teaches at Penn State, believes the most damaging element about Beijing's spying efforts is that the targets are not limited to state secrets.

"This," he said, "is primarily economic espionage, violations of export enforcement regulations and collecting of the type of data that are violations of law in the U.S., but not limited to national security components."

William Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the main and security adviser to the director of national intelligence, said that the threat is unrivaled.

"When it comes to stealing trade secrets and intellectual property from America, no country poses a greater threat than China," Evanina said. "America loses an estimated $300 to $500 billion annually to theft of intellectual property by China. It's the equivalent of every family of four in America losing $4,000 to $6,000 a year," Evanina said.

He confirms China's "whole-of-society" approach to espionage.

"While no one objects to a nation engaging in fair competition to advance in world markets, the Chinese government's tactics are anything but fair. It is pillaging technology and innovation from virtually every sector in America using a broad range of techniques and actors," Evanina said.

Evolving tactics

China is not the only nation-state or foreign actor that engages in this type of nontraditional espionage.

Their spying methods employ a wide range of tactics, a growing number of which do not involve human contact.

U.S. officials are most concerned about whether the nation has the bandwidth to defend against the threats.

China uses high-volume, nontraditional espionage; Russia employs a diverse, all-of-the-above approach which targets U.S. government secrets, economic data and personal information, while dozens of other adversarial countries and actors are targeting American interests. These are pushing the limits of U.S. defenses, Eftimiades and other experts said.

The problem is compounded by activities by allies of the U.S., who are also allegedly involved in the fray.

On Sept. 12, official Washington erupted into a near-panic after a media report suggested that Sting-Rays -- mobile phone surveillance devices -- were found near the White House, allegedly planted in an attempt to listen in on President Donald Trump's mobile phone calls.

The U.S. government concluded that Israel was most likely behind these devices, according to the article, but no proof was provided.

An Israeli Embassy spokesperson flatly denied these allegations. Elad Strohmayer said, "These allegations are absolute nonsense. Israel doesn't conduct espionage operations in the United States, period."

A source with knowledge of the situation told WTOP that the leaked information was based on allegations driven by political motivations.

WTOP began investigating reports of suspicious mobile phone surveillance in 2017 and submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of Homeland Security on April 19, 2018.

Below is DHS' response on April 24, 2018:

Dear Mr. Green:

This acknowledges receipt of your April 19, 2018, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), for February 6, 2018 DHS National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC) presentation "XXXXXXX XXXXXX" …

Despite repeated attempts to gain information, only one response, on July 24, 2019, has addressed the request, saying:

Your request is still out for search with the appropriate office. We are backlogged at the moment, and so, many cases are being processed slower than usual. We apologize for the inconvenience and will immediately notify you upon completion of your search.

The response, while an administrative and not a counterintelligence matter, lends credence to the concern that an unprecedented, existential wave of spying in the U.S. is underway. By their own admission, the agency tasked with answering FOIA requests dealing with possible cases of surveillance is wading through a long backlog of requests.

Regardless of the motives and methods of spies inside the U.S. and those working from the outside in, the rising wave of espionage is of enormous concern to U.S. allies, as well, because of the interconnected nature of U.S. intelligence efforts.

In his farewell speech Sept. 4, Duncan Lewis, head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, warned that foreign interference and espionage together create an unprecedented "existential threat."

Lewis said foreign interference and espionage outrank any other threat facing Australia and, by extension, its Western partners.

"It's my view that, currently, the issue of espionage and foreign interference is by far and away the most serious issue going forward," he said. Mesajı Paylaş
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In the third year of Perestroika, in 1988, the intelligence branch of the KGB was deep in a crisis - the headquarters in Yasenevo woods a few miles southwest of Moscow found the officers at KGB rezidenturas in Western countries increasingly reluctant to approach foreigners. They effectively turned off the aggressive recruiting mode the Soviet intelligence was once so famous.

In the United States, Soviet intelligence scored some spectacular successes in penetration, namely Aldrich Ames at CIA and Robert Hannssen at FBI, but the recruited Americans were the walk-ins - i.e. they themselves initiated the contact with Soviet spies, they were not approached by the Russians.

The Soviet Union was losing the Cold War and that certainly contributed to the confusion in KGB intelligence stations all over the world, but most importantly, the officers themselves didn't want to risk their postings in the West. Being kicked out of a Western country if caught red-handed was not a particularly attractive idea at time when all kinds of shortages back home were already palpable.

Finally, the big shots at Yasenevo came up with a solution. It was a bold and witty idea, and the translated Analytical overview was part of it. Yasenevo suggested to exploit the natural advantages the KGB still enjoyed back home.

In addition to its espionage abroad, the KGB was always busy collecting "intelligence from the territory," a euphemism for recruiting foreign nationals in the Soviet Union, with an eye to subsequently running them as agents in their home countries. This system worked because the Soviet Union, as a police state, had an opportunity to watch literally every foreign national in the country. Each regional KGB department had what was called a First Section in charge of recruiting foreigners.

This activity was coordinated by the Directorate RT (Razvedka s Territorii: intelligence from territory) of the First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo.

The problem was that no so many foreigners wanted to come the Soviet Union. Now that was changing, thanks to Gorbachev, who was busy opening up the country.

But the Soviet Union was still a totalitarian state, meaning that there was no media, a trade union, or a nascent private enterprise (not to mention a government agency) in position to say no to the KGB if approached and asked to plant a spy in the organization under disguise.

These spies planted by the KGB were known as DR officers, Destvuyushego Rezerva: of the active reserve. The term had a long history; it was used since the 1920s.

The KGB's "Tradecraft in Intelligence Work from Cover Organizations on Soviet Territory," an analytical overview presented here for the first time in both its original Russian and in English translation, suggested boosting the activities of the Directorate RT as a way to compensate the passivity of hibernated intelligence stations abroad.

The beauty of the report was that it suggested combining two things, already at KGB disposal - the capabilities of planting KGB spies in almost any Soviet organization; and the activities of the Directorate RT in approaching foreigners now coming in big numbers to the Soviet Union.

The Directorate RT was thus encouraged to plant more spies in Soviet organizations with an eye to recruiting foreigners in the Soviet Union.

The report even suggested to send officers of the Directorate RT abroad to run its assets, and not to handle them to the intelligence stations in respective countries, probably acknowledging the reluctance of the intelligence stations to taking risks.

The Soviet regime was facing its collapse, but the KGB intelligence branch once again proved its resourcefulness and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

Andrei Soldatov, The coathor of "The Compatriots: The Brutal and Chaotic History of Russia's Exiles, Émigrés, and Agents Abroad" Mesajı Paylaş
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'The intelligence coup of the century'

For decades, the CIA read the encrypted communications of allies and adversaries

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"Ele sırrını veren, kendini ele verir."

Şehir devletin tarih sahnesine çıktığı 6 bin yıl öncesinden beri adına "devlet" dediğimiz tüm siyasi toplumsal örgütlenmeler bir şekilde varlıklarını sürdürmek, büyümek ve yönettikleri toplumsal düzeni ayakta tutmak için etrafındaki diğer devletlerle ilişki kurmuş ve bu ilişkilere yönelik politikaları uygularken haberleşme ve istihbarat çalışmaları kaçınılmaz olmuştur. Mektuplar ilk çağlarda bile rakip devletin ya da oluşumun eline geçtiğinde içerdiği mesaj anlaşılmasın diye şifreli yazılmaktaydı.

"Kriptografi" ya da "şifreyazım" denilen ve yazıyla iletilen veri ve bilgilerin hasımlar/rakipler/yetkisiz kişiler/hatta yeri geldiğinde müttefikler tarafından anlaşılmasını imkânsız hale getirmek veya zorlaştırmak amacıyla kullanılan yöntemlerin bilimi; çok eski çağlarda kelimelerin farklı anlamlarda kullanılması yoluyla yapılan ilkel şifreleme yöntemlerinden, günümüzde matematik, bilgisayar mühendisliği ve dilbiliminin kullanıldığı ve özel üretilmiş algoritma ve cihazlarla mesajın şifrelendiği yöntemlere kadar çeşitli metotlar geliştirerek güvenli veri ve bilgi paylaşımını sağlamıştır.


Tarihte bilinen ilk şifreyazım örneği, M.Ö. 1900'e doğru Mısırlı bir kâtibin bazı kitabelerde hiyeroglif yazı tekniğini anlam verilemeyecek şekilde kullandığının arkeologlarca keşfedilmesiyle karşımıza çıktı. Belki de bir dilin mesajının imgelerle aktarılması prensibine dayanan hiyeroglif tekniğinin hala tam olarak çözülememesinden kaynaklanan bu keşiften 1850 yıl sonra, Sezar'ın talimatıyla geliştirilen ve metindeki her harfin kendisinden 3 harf sonrakiyle yer değiştirmesi şeklindeki ilkel bir yönteme başvuran Roma kriptografisi, Sezar öldükten sonra da kullanılmaya ve farklı formlarda geliştirilmeye devam etti. Doğu Roma'nın Romadan tevarüs eden şifreyazımı geliştirerek kullandığını 8. Yüzyıl İslam kaynaklarının referans verdiği kayıp bir şifreleme kitabının yazarı olan Al Yahmadi'den biliyoruz. Al Yahmadi'nin kriptografi kitabını referans veren kitaplar, kendisinin, ele geçirilen ve imparatora yazılmış bir Doğu Roma mektubunun Yunanca şifreli metnini çözdüğünü anlatır. Roma mektubu klasik şifreyazım tekniklerinin tüm unsurlarını kullanmıştı: Anlaşılmayan bir açık metin, şifreleme ve bunun için gerekli bir anahtar.

Şifreyazımın kamu gücü tarafından kullanımı, yabancı misyonların ve büyükelçiliklerin kurulmasıyla daha da arttı. Diplomaside modern büyükelçilik sisteminin ilk filizlenişi 13. Yüzyıl başlarında rönesans İtalyasında deniz ticareti yoluyla kar peşinde koşan ticaret burjuvazisinin İtalyan şehir devletlerine dayattığı ihtiyaçlardan doğmuştu: yeni pazarlara ve ticaret yollarına hâkim olmak, mevcut pazarlardaki karı artırmak ve bu konudaki rakipler hakkında ticari ve siyasi malumat toplamak. Kendisi de tacir olan bir aristokratın büyükelçi olarak gönderildiği ülkede devamlı kalması ve bu devamlılığı sağlayacak yardımcı personelden oluşan bir çeşit "ofis"in kurulması işte bu yıllara kadar geri gider ve bunun ilk örnekleri birbirine rakip tüccar şehir devletlerin kümelendiği Kuzey İtalya'da görülür (Bu arada evet, ilk büyükelçiler aristokrattı ve bu da hala neden bazıları gereksiz hale gelmiş o protokol ve davranış yığınının biz soylu olmayanları bu kadar şaşırtıp bazen özendirdiğini çokça da içimizi sıktığını açıklıyor.). Bu daha sonra tüm Avrupa'ya, hatta belki de Kuzey Avrupa'dan da önce Osmanlı'ya kadar yayılan devlet daireleri şebekesi, zamanla tüm modern devletlerin öteki için uyguladığı politikalar hakkında malumat topladığı ve iletişimi kurduğu "istasyonlar" görevini de gördü. Devamlı büyükelçi, aynı zamanda bulunduğu ülkede istihbarat toplayan ajanların temasa geçtiği, o ülkedeki beşinci kol faaliyetlerinin yürütüldüğü bir istasyon şefiydi.  Anavatanla ve ajanlarla iletişim tabii ki kriptografi yoluyla yapılıyordu. Hemen hemen bütün iletişim.

Modern çağlara kadar şifreyazım iki temel dilbilimsel yönteme ya da bunların sentezine dayandı:

1. Her bir harf yerine başka bir harfin (daha ilerleyen yıllarda harflerin) gelmesini sağlayarak metni anlamsızlaştırmak. Basit bir örnek: "Saat 10'da saldırın." ifadesi; S yerine a, a yerine c, t yerine k, 1 yerine 3, 0 yerine 5, d yerine l, l yerine m, ı yerine v, r yerine e, ne yerine b kullanılarak metin "Acck 35'lc acmlvevb." haline dönüşür.

2. Kullanılan cümlenin farklı bir anlama sahip olması. Çok bilinen bir örnek : "Ayşe tatile çıktı." Bu yöntem özellikle telefon konuşmalarında kullanılsa da yazışmalara da uygulanabilir hatta şifrelenen cümle bazen bu yöntemle daha da zor çözülür hale getirilebilir.


Batı Avrupanın ilk dış misyonlarında şifreli yazılar kimya biliminden de yararlanmaya çalıştı. Yazı şifreleneceğine görünmez yapılamaz mıydı? Görünmez mürekkepten ilk bahseden kişi Roma'da M.S. 1. Yüzyılda yaşamış filozof ve yazar Yaşlı Plinius'tu ve soğan suyu, limon suyu, idrar, yumurta akı, sirke gibi organik malzemenin veya bunların karışımının mürekkep olarak kullanılması şeklindeki görünmez mürekkep uygulamalarına özellikle Batı Avrupa'da yeniçağ boyunca başvuruldu. Görünmez mürekkep Amerikan devrim savaşlarında (1775-1783), birinci ve ikinci dünya savaşında kullanılmaya devam etti.

20. Yüzyılda bu konuda öncülüğü Almanlar yapıyordu. Artık laboratuarlar, kimyacılar ve fizikçiler sadece patlayıcı üretiminde değil, gizli yazışmalarının kelimenin tam anlamıyla görülmemesi için de devletin hizmetindeydiler. Nazi Almanyası'nın istihbarat teşkilatı Abwehr, ajanların güvenilirlik derecelerine göre belirlenmiş 5 farklı seviyede görünmez mürekkep üretmişti. Zira her zaman olduğu gibi ajanların bir kısmı çift taraflı çalışıyor olabilirdi, ya da kifayetsizdiler. Bu mürekkeplerin en gelişmişini okumak için mesajı alan, belgeyi ıslatmak, üzerine naftalin içeren kırmızı barut serpmek ve ardından 60 derece sıcaklıkta ısıttığı kâğıdı morötesi ışığa tutmak zorundaydı. Bir diğer formül, görünmez mürekkebin aktive olması için yazanın kanını daha önceden kendine verilen bir karışıma eklemesini gerektiriyordu. Müttefikler buna şüpheli kâğıtlara ya da nesnelere (bu bazen Alman casus George Dasch olayında olduğu gibi yakalanan bir ajanın kumaş mendili olabilirdi) mor ötesi ışık ve ısı yayan, buhar püskürten bir takım görünmezlik kırıcı aletler bularak cevap verdiler ve kısmen başarılı olmaya başladıklarındaysa Almanlar mürekkeplerde üç saat süren üç farklı uygulama gerektiren reaktifleri kullanarak yeni formüller geliştirdiler.

Savaş boyunca devam eden laboratuarların görünmez yazı rekabeti soğuk savaşa da taşındı. Özellikle 50'li yıllarda Demokratik Almanya Cumhuriyeti'nin meşhur istihbarat teşkilatı Stasi ve SSCB'nin KGB'si yeni yöntemler üzerinde çalıştılar ve ilginç bir sonuç elde ettiler: Kuru Transfer Yöntemi. Burada belge üç tabakadan oluşuyordu. Birbirine yapışmış iki sıradan kâğıt tabakası arasında kimyasal bir tabaka bulunuyordu. En üst tabakadaki kâğıda şifreli mesaj yazıldığında ortadaki kimyasal en alt tabakadaki kâğıda yazılanları görünmez bir şekilde kopyalıyordu. İlk tabaka mesajı alan tarafından suyla tamamen imha edilirken ortadaki kimyasal tabakaya bir şey olmuyor ve defalarca kullanılabiliyordu. Bu yöntem daha sonra Vietnam'daki ABD'li esirlerin ülkelerine mesaj yollamaları esnasında da kullanılmıştı. 50'li ve 60'lı yıllar boyunca CIA'de görünmez yazı teknikleri üzerinde çalışan 36 uzman istihdam edilmişti. Bu sayı Stasi'de 50 idi. Soğuk Savaş sona ererken bu konudaki çalışmaların da sonlandığı tahmin ediliyor. Fakat bundan hiçbir zaman emin olamayız.


Kriptografinin stenografiyle ve limon suyuyla harmanlandığı çağlardan modern zamana geldiğimizde karşımıza çıkan en büyük farklılık ise şifreleme makineleridir. Devletler tarafından resmi ve gizli iletişimde şifreleme makinelerinin kullanımı 20. Yüzyılın başlarında kendini gösteren bir olgudur.

Aydınlanma, birçok şeyin yanı sıra matematiğin ve mantığın, dolayısıyla şifreleme tekniklerinin de giderek daha fazla gelişmesine yol açtı. Dilbilimciler ve matematikçiler 18. Yüzyıl'da bu konuda kafa yormaya başladılar.  Nitekim 1790'da, aynı zamanda hukukçu, mimar ve filozof olan ABD üçüncü başkanı Thomas Jefferson yazılı bir mesajın şifrelenmesi için, üzerlerinde ingiliz alfabesinin 26 harfinin olduğu, birbine bağlı ve oynayan disklerden oluşan ve adına Jefferson diski ya da şifre tekerleği adı verilen bir silindiri icat etti. Söz konusu silindir Paerke Hitt tarafından çok daha geliştirilerek 1922'de M-94 adıyla piyasaya sürülen şifre makinesine temel teşkil etti.

İlk makinelerin mantığı düz metni farklı kombinasyonlarda şifreli bir hale getirmek ve muhatabın bu şifreyi çözmesini sağlayacak yönteme sahip olmasına dayanıyordu. Makineler yukarıda verilen "Saat 10'da saldırın" örneğindeki şifrelemenin çok farklı biçimlerini çok sayıda ve kısa sürede üretebilmemizi sağlıyordu. Metni yazan taraf bir şifreleme yöntemiyle onu bu şekilde okunmaz hale getirir ve aynı şifreleme yöntemini bilen karşı taraf bu metni okunur hale getirirdi. Tabi bu yöntemin bir şekilde öğrenilebilmesi mümkün olduğundan, yöntem sürekli değiştirilmelidir.


1920'lerde şifreleme makinelerinin aktif bir şekilde kullanımı başlamıştı. İkinci dünya savaşı, üzerinden uzun zaman geçtiğinden ve günümüzde şifreleme yöntemleri çok daha farklı bir hale geldiğinden şifreleme savaşları hakkında görece çok daha fazla şey bildiğimiz bir dönemdir. Bu döneme damgasını buran makine Enigma'dır. Makine ünlü kriptografi tarihçisi David Khahn tarafından biraz da abartılı bir biçimde binlerce yıllık kriptografi tarihinin en büyük buluşu olarak nitelenmektedir.

Enigma aslında 1920'li yıllardan beri kullanılıyordu ve Almanya birçok müttefiğine (Japonya, İtalya, İspanya) ve hatta ABD, İngiltere, Hollanda, İsveç, İsviçre, Polonya gibi ülkelere farklı modelleri satmıştı. Elektromekanik bir rotor makinesi olan Enigma'da daktilo klavyesine benzeyen klavyenin tuşlarına basıldığında rotorlar dönmekte ve şifre üretilmekteydi. Savaş döneminde Alman ordusu için daha gelişmiş güvenlik sistemlerine sahip Enigma modelleri üretildi. Özellikle Alman donanmasının bunaltıcı denizaltı saldırılarının olduğu 1940-1942 döneminde Enigma denizaltı rotaları ve saldırı seçeneklerinin gizli tutulmasında önemli bir rol oynadı. Enigma'nın gelişmiş modeli, bilgisayar biliminin kurucusu sayılan İngiliz matematikçi ve kriptocu Alan Turing'in de bizzat katıldığı büyük bir ekibin uzun süren çabaları sonucunda 1942 Aralık ayında deşifre edildi. Aslında Enigma'nın çözülmesine yönelik çabalar bir Alman casusu olan Hans Thilo Schimdt'in Enigma kullanım kılavuzu fotoğraflarını Fransız ve İngilizler'e temin ettiği 1931 yılına kadar gider. Fakat buna rağmen ne Fransız ne İngiliz kriptoanalizciler Enigma şifresini çözemedi. Söz konusu belgelerin Polonya Kriptografi Bürosuna veirlmesiyle Enigma'nın ilk versiyonları polonyalı matemeatikçi ve kriptolojist Marian Rejewski tarafından 1932 yılında çözüldü ve 1933 - 1938 arasında Alman hükümetine ait birçok mesaj okunabildi. Ancak Almanya Enigma'yı sürekli olarak geliştiriyordu ve yeni modellerin güvenlik sistemi her defasında daha da güçlü oluyordu. 1942 Aralığında çözülen son model Enigma en çok Alman deniz kuvvetleri tarafından kullanılan modeldi ve bu deşifre işleminin Atlantik savaşının seyrini değiştirdiği söylenir.

Elbette bu abartılı bir çıkarım. Zira endüstrisi için gerekli hammadde konusunda ciddi sorunlar yaşayan Almanya'nın savunma sanayii üretim hızı, hele ABD'nin de savaşa dâhil olmasıyla müttefiklerinkinin yanına bile yaklaşamıyordu. Ancak Enigma'nın deşifre edilmesinin özellikle denizaltı saldırılarından müttefikleri koruyan önemli etkenlerden biri olduğunu söylemek gerekir. Savaş bitene kadar Almanlar Enigma'nın çözüldüğünden bihaber iletişime devam ettiler.


Bilgisayar teknolojisinin gelişimi özellikle 70'li yıllardan itibaren şifreleme yönteminde "anahtar" adı verilen, mesajı değiştiren ve şifrenin çözülmesini sağlayan çok gelişmiş algoritmaların bulunmasına yol açtı. Anahtarlı sistemler iki çeşittir. "Gizli anahtarlı şifreleme"  ya da "simetrik şifreleme",  hem şifreleme hem de deşifre işlemi için aynı anahtarın kullanıldığı bir yöntemdir. Burada anahtarın başkası tarafından bilinmemesi çok önemlidir. İkinci yöntem olan "Açık anahtarlı şifreleme"de metni yazan taraf, göndermek istenilen mesajı şifrelemede kullanılan "genel anahtar/açık anahtar" denilen bir anahtarla verilmek istenen mesajın metnini değiştirdikten sonra yollar. Metni alan tarafın sahip olduğu anahtar ise kişisel bir anahtardır, buna "gizli/özel anahtar" denir ve kişi bu özelleştirilmiş anahtarla söz konusu açık metnin vermek istediği mesajı çözer. Bu iki anahtar çifti matematiksel olarak birbirleriyle bağlantılıdır. Her zaman olduğu gibi anahtarlar şifrenin çözülmesi ihtimaline karşı düzenli olarak değiştirilir.

Anahtarlı şifreleme yöntemi zamanla kolayca çözülür hale geldiğinden yakın zamanda "anahtarsız şifreleme" yani anahtar kullanmayan kriptografik algoritmalarla şifreleme yöntemi bulundu. Bu şifrelemelerin kırılmasının imkânsız değilse de çok uzun zaman (aylar, bazen yıllar) alacağı söylenmektedir.

1970 li yıllara kadar şifreyazım sadece diplomatik, siyasi ve askeri amaçlarla kullanılıyordu. Ancak henüz küreselleşmenin erken evresinin yaşandığı ve neoliberalizmin kuluçka aşamasında olduğu 70'li yıllarda bile şirketler farklı pazarlara nüfuz etmek, rekabet ve patent hukukunu aşmak, rakiplerinin fiyat ve satış politikalarını etkilemek, rakip ürünler hakkında kritik bilgiye sahip olmak, farklı devletler ve uluslararası örgütler nezdinde lobi faaliyetleri yapabilmek ve tüm bunları yaparken "yakalanmamak, hukuktan kaçabilmek" amacıyla ticari casusluğa başladılar. Aynı zamanda firmalar, ticarsi casusluktan korunmak için kendi kripto yazışmalarını ve mesajlaşmalarını yapabilecekleri kapasiteyi de geliştirmeye başladılar.

O yıllarda bilgisayar teknolojisinin arşiv ve dokümantasyon amaçlarıyla kullanımı çok sınırlıydı. Bilişimin bu alanlarda kamu ve özel tüm örgütlenmelere hâkim olmasından sonra kriptografi farklı bir alanla işbirliğini, dolayısıyla kabiliyetlerini giderek artırdı: bilgisayar teknolojileri. İnternet üzerinden transfer edilen bilgi ve verilerin güvenliği gün geçtikçe daha fazla önem kazandı. Bu arada hem özel firmalar hem devletin istismarına karşı bireyin kişisel verilerinin korunması ve dokunulmazlığı başlı başına bir hukuk branşı haline geldi. Yine de bir Türk atasözünde dediği gibi, "hırsıza kilit olmaz". 2013 yılının Ekim aynda Adobe firması, sistemlerinin "hack" edilerek 2.9 milyon Adobe kullanıcısına ilişkin kimlik ve şifrelenmiş password bilgilerine hatta kredi ve banka kartı bilgilerine ulaşıldığını açıkladığında ve bir ay sonra BBC bu sayının aslında çok daha fazla (38 milyon) olduğunu yazdığında aslında şifreleme için dayanak teşkil eden tüm imkânların şifreyi çözmek isteyenlere de hizmet ettiği gerçeği bir kez daha herkesin yüzüne vurulmuş oluyordu. Bugün kişisel veriler kavramı bireyin kredi ve banka kartı şifrelerinden e devlet uygulaması şifrelerine kadar birçok bilgiyi ve aynı zamanda sağlık kayıtları ve tatil tercihleri gibi ona ait pek çok mahrem bilgiyi ve veriyi de içermektedir. Demokratik düzenin gereği bireyin kişisel verilerinin mahremiyetine özen veren bir anlayışın hukuk, yargı ve kolluk tarafından yerleştirilmesi gerektirmektedir.

Artık tüm ciddi firmalar, özellikle küresel ölçekte operasyonları olan holding ve tröstler, devletlerin sınai sırları ele geçirerek teknolojik sıçrama yapmak ve rakip holdinglerin daha fazla kar etmek ve daha kolay rekabet etmek amacıyla yapabilecekleri bilgi ve veri hırsızlığına karşı ciddi kriptografi kapasitesi geliştirmiştir. Hatta bu kapasite, küresel holdingler, bilişim firmaları ve sosyal ağ şirketleri dikkate alındığında birçok devletin kabiliyetlerinin ve erişiminin ötesine geçmiştir.

Washinton Post gazetesinde 11 Şubat 2020 tarihli Greg Miller yazısı, 130'dan fazla devlete kripto cihazları satmış olan İsviçre merkezli CryptoAG adlı firmanın gizli sahiplerinin CIA ile Alman istihbarat teşkilatı BND olduğunu ve firmanın ürünlerine ilişkin sırları CIA ile paylaştığını, böylece aralarında Türkiye'nin de bulunduğu 130'dan fazla ülkenin en gizli sırlarına vakıf olduğu iddiasını ortaya attı.

Bu şartlar dikkate alındığında milli bir kriptografi kapasitesinin geliştirilmesinin ve güvenliğinin sağlanmasının milli güvenlik açısından büyük önemi haiz olduğu açıktır.
Peki, nedir bu kapasite? Nasıl geliştirilir? Nasıl örgütlenir? Güvenliği nasıl sağlanır?
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Milli Şifreyazım Politikamızın belirlenmesi ve buna uygun strateji ve planlamaların yapılması

Tüm gelişmeler Türkiye'de milli bir şifreyazım politikasının oluşturulmasını elzem kılmaktadır. Söz konusu politika dış politik ve ekonomik hedeflerimizle ve güvenlik siyasetimizle uyumlu olmalı ve bu politikaya uygun resmi dokümanlar ilgili kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının (başta Milli İstihbarat Başkanlığı, Dışişleri Bakanlığı, İçişleri Bakanlığı, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı ve bağlı kuruluşlar), konuyla ilgili güvenilir akademik/bilimsel kuruluşların ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının görüşleri alınarak oluşturulmalıdır. Söz konusu politikanın belirlenmesini müteakip, ilgili alt alanlarda (dış politika, güvenlik, ekonomi, istihbarat) stratejiler hazırlanmalı, bu stratejiler ihtiyaca göre güncellenmeli, stratejilerin uygulamasına yönelik bütçelendirmeyi ve hedeflerin zamanlamasını da içeren yıllık planlamalar yapılmalı, hesap verilebilirliği teminen uygulama yıllık olarak izlenmeli ve değerlendirilmelidir.

Ulusal Bilgi Güvenliği mevzuatının geliştirilmesi ve kodifikasyonu

Yazılı kurallar olmadan devlet çarkını işletemezsiniz. Çarkı döndüren ilk etkiyi mevzuat verecektir. Dolayısıyla devlet kurumlarının bilgi güvenliğinin, insan haklarına saygılı demokratik hukuk devletine uygun bir şekilde tesisi ve korunması amacıyla genel ve somut normları belirleyen kurallar bütününe ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.

Bilgi güvenliği şifreyazımı da içeren ancak diğer bileşenleriyle onu aşan bir kavramdır ve bilgilerin izinsiz kullanımı, ifşa edilmesi, yok edilmesi, değiştirilmesi, bilgilere hasar verilmesi veya bilgilere izinsiz erişimlerin engellenmesini kapsamaktadır. Bu anlamda, her türlü araç kullanılarak yapılan hem yazılı hem sesli iletişimi ihtiva eder. Dolayısıyla şifreyazım kurallarının ulusal bilgi güvenliği mevzuatının bir parçası olduğu belirtilmelidir.

Mevzuat hangi bilgilerin şifreli olarak gönderilmesi, hangi resmi yazıların gizli/çok gizli ibaresiyle gönderilmesi gerektiği konusunda da yürürlükteki mevzuattan daha açık ve net normlar belirlemelidir.  Zira başta şifreli haberleşme olmak üzere gizli/çok gizli yazışmalar konusunda kamu kurumları arasında ciddi bir kafa karışıklığı söz konusu olabilmektedir. Mevzu bahis kurallar mevcut halde farklı kanunlarda dağınık bir şekilde bulunmaktadır ve gerek yasa yapıcının, gerek uygulayıcının, gerekse yargının konuya ilişkin karar ve tavırlarında yeknesaklığa engel olmaktadır.

Tüm bu mevzuatı tek metinde toplayacak (kodifiye edecek), yürütecek kurumların yetki ve sorumlulukları, mevzuattan etkilenecek vatandaşların hakları, mevzuatın amaç ve kapsamı ve gerekçesinin bulunduğu genel bir çerçeve yasa ve ona bağlı ikincil mevzuat (yönetmelikler) yine politika ve strateji belirlenirken kullanılan yönetişim teknikleriyle hazırlanmalı ve yürürlüğe konulmalıdır.

Ulusal Bilgi Güvenliğine ve Milli Kriptografiye Yönelik Yönetsel Kapasitenin Artırılması

Ulusal Bilgi güvenliğinin uygulanmasından sorumlu farklı kurumlar arasındaki koordinasyonla görevlendirilecek bir kurum, gerek mevzuatın uygulanması gerek politikaların belirlenmesi ve güncellenmesinde genel koordinasyonu sağlamalıdır. Bunun için yeni bir kurum teşkil etmek gerekmez. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Milli İstihbarat Başkanlığı'nda uzmanlaşmış personelin çalıştığı bir birimin yetki,  insan kaynakları ve maddi kaynaklar açısından güçlendirilmesi yeterli olacaktır.

Bunun yanı sıra, ulusal bilgi güvenliği için gerekli diğer bileşenlerin yanı sıra, milli kriptografi altyapısının kurulması, kriptografi algoritması geliştirilmesi ve güvenliğinin sağlanması, kriptografide standartlaşma, modern kripto cihazlarının yerli ve milli olarak üretilmesinden sorumlu bir teknoloji enstitüsüne ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır. Bunun için Tübitak bünyesindeki SAGE benzeri bir birim teşkil edilebilir ve faaliyete geçirilebilir. Söz konusu birimin akademi ile ve aselsan ve havelsan gibi elektronik ve yazılım konusunda birikim sahibi sanayi aktörleriyle işbirliği içinde olması ve birimin mevzuat ve teşkilat yapısının çalışanlara yüksek ücretler verebilecek bir ücretlendirme politikasına müsaade etmesi gerekir. Birimde dilbilimci, matematikçi, bilgisayar ve yazılım mühendisi, "hacker", şifre kırıcı vb. alana uygun arkaplandan gelen uzmanlaşmış personelin çalıştırılması gerekir.

Yazıda Görünmezlik Teknolojisi: Hala faydalı mı?

Tarihten zihin açıcı örnekler alarak geleceği belirlemek her zaman mümkündür. Genellikle dikkatle yaklaşmayı gerektirecek pek çok öznellikler barındırsa da, tarih bugün için geçmişte yapılmış deneylerin takibidir. Soğuk Savaşın sonuna kadar izini sürebildiğimiz görünmez yazı teknolojileri çalışmaları ülkemizin de gündemine alması gereken bir husustur. Milli şifreyazım politikamızın uygulama alanlarından biri de kimyacılarımız ve fizikçilerimiz tarafından geliştirilecek bir milli görünmez yazı teknolojisi olmalıdır. Yazının giderek dijitalleşmesi bu tarz bir tedbiri gereksiz gibi gösterse de hala kâğıt kullanımı yoğun bir şekilde sürmektedir ve özellikle beşinci kol faaliyetlerinde posta hizmetleri hasım veya rakip devletlerin/örgütlerin dikkatinden çok kolay kaçabilecektir. Söz konusu konseptin sadece fiziksel yazıya değil dijital ortama da uygulanması için bilişim teknolojilerinden yararlanılmalı, çevrim içi ve dijital araçlarla yazılı mesaj iletiminde "yazının görünmezliğini" sağlayacak yazılımsal çalışmalar yapılmalıdır.

Resmi Dil Dışındaki Dillerin Kullanımı

2. Dünya savaşında ABD donanmasında Navajo, Cherokee, Cree, Comanche, Choctaw, Assiniboine, Mohawk, Meskwaki, Tlingit ve Muscogee yerlilerinin dillerde hatta Baskça'da, İngiltere tarafından Gallerce'de, 1973 Arap-İsrail savaşı sırasında Mısır tarafından Nübye dilinde, 1979 Çin-Vietnam savaş srasında Çin tarafından Wenzhounese dilinde telefon iletişiminin yapılması, özellikle savaş sırasında birlikler arasındaki sözlü/sesli iletişim güvenliğinin sağlanması için az bilinen yerel dillerin kullanımına örnek olarak verilebilir.

Her ne kadar hasım/rakip tarafından bilinme ihtimali düşük bir yerel dilin kullanılması sesli iletişim güvenliği açısından tercih edilse de, söz konusu metot şifrelenmiş yazılı iletişime de uygulanabilir. Venezuela Büyükelçiliği'ne gönderilecek Lazca ya da Osetçe şifreli bir metnin Brezilya tarafından şifre çözülse de uzun süre (belki de hiçbir zaman) anlaşılamayacak olmasının avantajı hepten küçümsenmemelidir.

Diplomatik çanta

Kriptograifden ve güvenliğinden bahsederken "diplomatik çanta" ya da bazı ülkelerdeki adlandırmayla "diplomatik torba"dan bahsetmemek olmaz. Çünkü genellikle anahtarların, şifre rehberlerinin, kripto cihazlarının ve diğer gizli materyalin yabancı ülkeye güvenli bir şekilde sokulması bu yolla olur.

Diplomatik çanta, diplomatik misyonun (büyükelçilik, konsolosluk, temsilcilik) görevli bulunduğu ülkeye arama yapılmadan ve el konulmadan sokabildiği her çeşit konteynırdır. Söz konusu haklar 1961 tarihli Diplomatik İlişkiler Hakkında Viyana Sözleşmesi ve imzacı ülkelerin buna dayalı ulusal mevzuatı tarafından teminat altına alınmıştır. Kavram oldukça esnek yorumlanır ve kutu, çanta, bavul hatta konteynırı içerir. Türkiye de, Viyana sözleşmesine taraf diğer devletler gibi bu tarz donanım ve materyali ülkemizden dış temsilciliklere ya da dış temsilciliklerden ülkemize taşırken bu imkândan faydalanmaktadır.

Eğitim ve Farkındalık

Kamu kurumlarında tüm yukarıdakileri uygulayacak personelin ve kritik öneme sahip özel sektör ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarındaki uygulayıcıların, akademi ve ilgili kurumların da işbirliğiyle sürekli ve düzenli olarak eğitilmesi gerekmektedir.

Vatandaş ta bu alandaki hakları ve sorumlulukları hususunda farklı kanallarla bilgilendirilmelidir.

Kriptoyu lüzumsuz bilgiye boğmak: yetersizliğin gücü

Kongo diktatörünün karısının karıştığı yolsuzluk, Arnavutluk'taki Bektaşi tekkesinin başındaki babanın geçirdiği ameliyat, Avrupa Birliğinin Ortak Tarım Politikasının belirlenmesi için yapılan kamuya açık bir konferansın özeti ya da Pentagon tarafından Japonya'daki bir ABD üssünün kapanmasının planlanıyor olması gibi her internet okuryazarının ulaşabileceği milyonlarca bilginin kriptolu bir şekilde iletilmesi, tüm kriptolarınızı okuyan yabancı bir devlet memuru açısından kısa zamanda sıkıcı bir kâbusa dönüşüyor olmalı. Kriptolu metinlerdeki malumatın kahır ekseriyetinde gizli bilgi bulunmaması durumu, aslında bir takım yetersizliklerin, dışişleri ve istihbarat bürokrasisinde gerçek anlamda uzmanlaşma olmamasının, istihbarat için yeterli maddi kaynağın ayrılmamış olmasının, dış temsilcilik kurulan birçok ülkede, söz konusu ülkelere yönelik analitik ve ulusal bir stratejinin ve bu stratejiye uygun planlamanın dolayısıyla önceliklendirmenin mevcut olmamasının ve sahadaki yetersizliklerin bir itirafıdır. Tam da bu nedenlerle birçok ülke için istihbarat, çoğunlukla açık kaynak takibi, başka ülkelerce yapılan istihbarat paylaşımının ve sahadan alınan dedikodu kıvamındaki malumatın bildirilmesi şeklinde gerçekleşerek "dostlar alışverişte görsün" şiarı gözetilmek suretiyle amatörce yürütülmektedir. Kripto metin yumağındaki bu gereksiz bilgi bolluğunun şifreyi çözen hasımda vurdumduymazlığa ve az sayıdaki gerçekten önemli bilginin gözden kaçmasına neden olabileceğini, ancak bu kadar zavallı bir güce güvenilmemesi gerektiğini söyleyip hafif bir tebessüme neden olarak başlığımızı kapatalım.

Gizli yazı gerçekten gizli mi?

Zaman zaman, birçok kurumdan gelen ve birçok kuruma gönderilen Gizli veya Çok Gizli ibareli resmi yazıların içinde gerçekten gizli veya çok gizli bilgi arayıp bulamamak mümkündür. Kriptografiyle doğrudan ilgili olmasa da, gizlilik enflasyonuna neden olmamak için resmi yazışma kurallarına ilişkin mevzuatın daha net bir şekilde kaleme alınması gerekmektedir.


Milli Kriptografi bağımsız bir ulusal dış politika ve güvenlik politikasının olmazsa olmazıdır. Çok kutuplu dünyada farklı ve yeni müttefiklere ihtiyaç duyan, mevcut ittifak ilişkilerinde daha bağımsız ve etkili bir yer talep eden ülkemizin farklı ve yeni coğrafyalarda daha önce ne kamuoyumuzun, ne paydaşlarımızın ne de hasımlarımızın alışık olmadığı askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik faaliyetler içinde bulunduğu malumdur. Söz konusu aktiviteler arttıkça devlet içinde merkez ve taşra arasında, farklı kurumlar ve birimler arasında ve farklı devletlerle olan bilgi ve veri alışverişi de artmakta ve buna dayalı olarak gizlilik ihtiyacı da daha fazla hissedilmektedir.  

Yalnızca kurumlarımız arasındaki yazılı iletişimin değil, müttefik olduğumuz devletler ya da devlet dışı aktörlerle yaptığımız yazılı iletişimin de hasım veya rakip aktörler tarafından ele geçirilip deşifre edilebilir olması, hem sahada operasyonel anlamda, hem müzakere masasında diplomatik manada devleti zor duruma düşürecek ciddi bir zaaf olacaktır. Böylesi bir acziyete düşmemek bilhassa bağımsız dış politika ve güvenlik politikasının en kritik şartlarından biridir. Bu bağlamda, kriptografi alanında millileşme önemli bir güvenlik ve sanayi politikası hedefi olmalıdır.

Benzer şekilde milli güvenlik ve ekonomi açısından kritik öneme sahip özel sektör kuruluşları ve sivil toplum kuruluşları da yazılı iletişim güvenliği konusunda bilinçlendirilmeli ve milli kripto cihazları ve algoritmalarının bunlara özel üretilecek versiyonlarını temin ederek kullanmaları konusunda teşvik edilmelidir.

Üretilecek kriptopgrafi alt yapısı farklı modellerle müttefiklerimize ve paydaşlarımıza da satılmalı, söz konusu altyapının küresel ölçekte faaliyet gösteren ve kritik önemdeki özel sektör ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarımıza özelleştirilmiş versiyonları da geliştirilmelidir.

Tüm bu önlemler ülkemizin ekonomik, siyasi ve diplomatik alanda yürüteceği bağımsız politikalarını destekleyecek ve arzu edilen toplumsal refah ve barışın tesis edildiği özgür ve bağımsız bir Türkiye hedefinin güvenlik ve özgürlük dengesi dâhilinde gerçekleştirilmesinde pay sahibi olacaktır.


A Brief History of Cryptography". Cypher Research Laboratories. 24 January 2006.

Attocknie, Dana (April 7, 2014). "Last living Seminole Code Talker walks on, loved ones pay respects, honor hero". Native American Times.

Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). International Law: A Dictionary. Scarecrow Press. pp. 51-52.

Budiansky, Stephen (2000). Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. Simon and Schuster.

Fenton, Ben (22 June 2006). "Enigma and the British code of honour". The Daily Telegraph. London

Friedman, William F. (1965). "Six Lectures on Cryptology" (PDF). National Cryptology School, U.S. National Security Agency, declassified 1977, 1984.

Goffman, Daniel. "Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy." In The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire. Eds. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-74.

Hinsley, F. H; Stripp, Alan (2001). Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. Oxford University Press.

Haufler, Hervie (2014). Codebreakers' Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II. Open Road Media.  

Pineau, Roger (1996). The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing by David Kahn, internal CIA book review by Roger Pineau, ca. 1967, released to public 1996.

Whitfield DIFFIE and Martin E. HELLMAN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, VOL. 67, NO. 3, MARCH 1979 397 Privacy and Authentication: An Introduction to Cryptography.

Ronald Peter Barston, Modern diplomacy, Pearson Education, 2006.

Securityintelligence, "38 Million Reasons to use Cryptography for Business", November 11, 201,  Rick Robinson

Şifrelerin matematiği: Kriptografi, Odtü yayınevi, 2007, Canan Çimen, Sedat Akleylek, Ersan Akyıldız

"The Diplomats" in Jay Winter, ed. The Cambridge History of the First World War: Volume II: The State (2014) vol 2 p 68.

"Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961"(PDF). United Nations.

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The "Intelligence Engineering" (IE) Rationale


The emergent phenomenon of "Intelligence Engineering" (IE), also known as the "Bridgehead Methodology" after the work advanced by the Bridgehead Institute for Research and Consulting, is an approach that offers much. Starting to break-through onto the 'intelligence scene' from around 2015, and drawing on a combination of over 10 years' worth of "scholar-practitioner"-inspired theory introspections, as well as intelligence practice to more field-experienced pragmatic-based considerations and encounters, IE has a developing history and does not emerge from a vacuum.

There are many "follow-ups" that prevail along several different lines of inquiry. Defined in short as: "the use of scientific and technical knowledge to artfully create, operate, maintain, and dismantle complex devices, machines, structures, systems, and processes that support or disrupt human endeavor occurring in the intelligence context," IE also sells itself to various stakeholders. Those stakeholders, even extending to shareholders, ranging from governments and corporations over, down and across to individuals. Many participants are involved.

There are also several intelligence dynamics included. With an ensuing focus on the IE rationale, this article goes on to explain the whys and hows of IE, as it is observed regarding a variety of contemporary strategic and operating contexts. Several current intelligence-related debates and discussions become increasingly apparent, with their greater and continued evaluation encouraged. In certainty terms, much ambiguity persists, with IE acting as both a mediator and navigator.

The "So what?" relating to IE

IE can be readily advocated. In current circumstances, IE offers both intelligence practitioners to military operators and higher-level functioning commanders and policy- to decision-makers degrees of added benefit. Those attributes can be claimed across several different public/government and private/commercial/business sector contexts. In turn, relevant IE-related contexts are of both military and civilian to management and law enforcement/policing nature, together with being manifested across many simultaneously occurring different 'levels' of experience and activity from analysis to subsequent engineering. Noteworthy significance is thereby accrued.

As this article goes on to further introduce the rationale for IE, it further demonstrates how engaging in IE can enhance intelligence, including with a perspective relating to its associated operational- to higher, strategic-ranging work, and efforts that extend beyond. Therefore, this extended introduction to IE is undertaken together with exploring continuing-to-rapidly-develop IE utility and relevance regarding the current - and at least potential future - conduct of (advanced) intelligence analysis (answering the "what is it?" question) and assessment/estimation efforts (addressing the "so what?", "why?" and "what does it mean?" queries) of overall intelligence enterprises and processes. Decision-making advantage is not far behind.

Enhancing intelligence

During a contemporary era of much prominent mis- and disinformation, popularly termed as that of "fake news" and of "deep fakes." the general activity, even requirement, of continuing intelligence re-invigoration is firmly emphasized. Furthermore, most remarkably discernible, for instance, in the wake of former U.S. computer administrator, Edward Snowden's so-called revelations from June 2013 and rising up from the expeditionary encounters of costly early-21st Century "forever wars," IE "added value" and marketing-related "unique selling points" (USPs) increasingly emerge, and presciently.

That last trend is not least manifest as variously well-supported critical claims persist - for example, including also from the contemporary intelligence studies literature - that intelligence, as it persists in the lengthening post-9/11 (11 September 2001) environment, continues to this day to require some substantial change to even reform momentum behind its onward driving.

The re-invigoration of intelligence is evidently called for and claimed broadly. That is both strategically, for example, relating to strategic intelligence (STRATINT) and Defence Intelligence (DI/DEFINT) activities, as well as demanded more tactically and operationally in terms of tactical and/or operational intelligence (TACINT/OPINT) tasks. Those last tasks especially relate to "ramped-up" Military Intelligence (MI or MILINT) and increasingly expanding "Private (sector) Intelligence" endeavors, including "business intelligence" (BI), "market intelligence" to "competitive/competitor intelligence" domains.

More emerges. The focus on constant and ongoing intelligence re-invigoration, extending to its greater change and reform, is both claimed and proposed not least in terms of, for example, greater "top-down" investment in intelligence resources (both staff assignment and other asset allocations) and the more "bottom-up" energetic creative "doing" of intelligence over to its extended communication and heeding, such as what happens in terms of the "producer-consumer/end-user relationship" and associated dynamics.

As many differently-drawn intelligence limitation concerns continue to prevail - together with occasions of the always inevitable "intelligence failure" considerations (at least somewhere and at some point in time, both real or more imagined to perceived) - those last qualities of extending the boundaries of intelligence require their greater harnessing. That work is ideally undertaken together with suitably robust counter-intelligence safeguards being maintained firmly in place during the "responsibility to share" beyond merely the most restrictive and controlled "need to know" confines.

Extending beyond "single-factor" concerns

No single or one solution to all the challenges confronted, including those sketched above, has yet emerged. While undeniably boasting at least some helpful impact, contemporaneously enhanced C4ISR to C5ISR efforts - including Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities, amongst others, such as target acquisition or TA tasks - alone are insufficient for intelligence and its enterprises or processes when taken as a whole across all dimensions. Greater efforts are demanded.

As intelligence requirements extend further, quantitative shortages to qualitative shortcomings are most apparent. As today analysts to participants are characterized by others elsewhere as "swimming in sensors but drowning in data." or are otherwise "in effect, information-rich but knowledge-poor," further senses require their employment.

Frequently, more exceptional "critical minds" are called for, including with that consideration also significantly emerging beyond merely "secret" and "covert" or "clandestine" domains of intelligence activities. For example, situations and conditions of "critical thinking" are additionally invoked in relation to open sources and associated Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) work.

The changes just characterized soon lead to enhanced "sense-making" work. Unsurprisingly, yet with difficulty, that work is best done in conjunction and effectively balanced with the - often technical - sensors deployed. Especially in broader, multi-functional strategic and operational contexts where incredibly vexing "deal-capture" (and, if necessary) kill-chains exist, so that they instead prevail most proportionately, taking into adequate account critical legal, moral and ethical judgments. That scenario, too, intimately involves "all-source" and multiple intelligence disciplines or "multi-INTs" approaches, together with their enhanced fusion.

Vulnerabilities require their minimization to mitigation during the navigation and negotiation of the full panoply of risks confronted--approaches to methodologies, such as IE, help. Ultimately, IE offers a positive path forward while conditions and situations of 'multi-everything!' are confronted.

Connecting-up "multi-everything!"

IE boasts substantial connectivity. With its integrated theme-issue-problem-risk-hazard up and across to threat breaking-down then over to response synthesis roles - helping various stakeholders to decide 'what (to do) next?' - IE strives to meet and to deliver to the STARC intelligence (end-user/customer/consumer/client) criteria. Respectively, those criteria relate to Specificity, Timeliness, Accuracy, Relevance and Clarity, particularly in terms of intelligence outputs and the strategy-to-policy inputs intelligence brings overall.

Several intelligence limitations are surmounted through their extended addressing. As suggested, those STARC intelligence best practice benchmarking standards - together with extensively refined source-grading, verification and vetting, such as that, for instance, followed and advanced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - are especially noteworthy regarding the content of the intelligence product that is generated. Most obviously, as an instant example, those products include the intelligence outputs produced in the form of intelligence briefing reports consumed by multiple customers to end-users, albeit in different formats.

Under the umbrella of their greater encapsulation, "Several diverse areas of human and technical/technological activity are spanned…" by IE. As outlined in further detail in the IE textbook - A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional (New York: Rowman & Littlefield / SPIES - Security & Professional Intelligence Education Series, 2017) - when concluding, it notes:

As IE is further advanced, overall efforts move from (1) roughly sketched out ideas and plans to (2) being more realistically launched and tangibly progressed in terms of the subsequent implementation and operationalization of those ideas and plans.

Ultimately, several interconnected processes are raised for at least their consideration, underlining the comprehensive "joining-up" scope of IE. Equally, while unavoidably operating in another strong feature of today's intelligence world, so-called "big data" contexts, IE again assists and not only as an additional filter. Potential pathways and directions forward become more resolved when IE is applied.

Conclusions: IE "added value"

As already suggested, the rationale for IE is clear. Furthermore, IE has ready equal applicability to those commercial businesses to defense and security contexts and activities that range further afield, including in both qualitative (types of tasks) and quantitative (volume/amount) terms. The much enhanced work of today's Special (Operational) Forces (SOF), and the closely associated 'covert action' activities they undertake, is able to be readily invoked for - not always wanted - prominent attention-catching examples.

Further engagement with IE pays dividends in several diverse ways, allowing for further intelligence input to greater transparency in oversight and accountability terms. That intelligence enhancement via IE remains a necessity ('need to have') not merely a luxury ('nice to have') in today's increasingly volatile world and when negotiating several multiplexic operating environments that are both experienced and encountered by a broad range of participants, whether they are involved willingly or not.

At its least, IE offers a blueprint for how the extra intelligence input can be, first, acquired (in terms of collection and gathering); and, then, interpreted and managed (in terms of analysis and assessment/estimation activities). On ready bases, more 'sense-making' and subsequent 'actioning' is both viable and deliverable, with IE performing a substantial and easily expandable role. Offering several benefits, IE, therefore, deserves further attention.

Adam D.M. Svendsen, Ph.D. (Warwick, UK), is an established international intelligence & defence strategist, researcher, educator & consultant. He is multi-sector experienced to a senior level, with several peer-reviewed publications (4 books; over 20 articles, etc.) - see more via | Twitter: @intstrategist & @BridgeheadInst1

Salem B.S. Dandan is an established security researcher & educator who specialises on the Middle East. He has an extensive background in both the public & private sectors & as a business entrepreneur - see more via Mesajı Paylaş
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DARPA asks BAE To Develop Machine Learning Powered Global Awareness Service

The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has asked BAE Systems to develop machine learning analytics services as part of its Geospatial Cloud Analytics (GCA) programme.

"BAE Systems aims to develop machine learning analytics as a service - a first-of-its-kind, cloud-based model for the government - that can leverage commercial and open source data to deliver constant worldwide situational awareness for a diverse range of challenges. Research on the GCA program leverages BAE Systems' machine learning and artificial intelligence capabilities such as adaptive reasoning and analysis in its autonomy technology," the company said Wednesday.

This new technology model seeks to provide an automated service that aims to leverage commercial and open source data, including satellite imagery, to deliver continuous worldwide situational awareness for a diverse range of challenges, including anomaly detection and prediction.

As part of DARPA's Geospatial Cloud Analytics (GCA) program, the BAE Systems FAST Labs research and development team aims to use the company's Multi-INT Analytics for Pattern Learning & Exploitation (MAPLE) technology to offer MAPLE as a service (MaaS).

This approach seeks to apply automated analytics to a problem, freeing operators to query the data to answer specific questions about important mission issues at hand while removing the traditional need to conduct extensive manual analysis. For the purposes of this program, the BAE Systems team seeks to apply MaaS to a proposed maritime challenge to automatically and reliably detect vessels that are engaging in illegal fishing. Mesajı Paylaş
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