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Haz 09, 2019, 05:48 ÖÖ Last Edit: Haz 09, 2019, 06:47 ÖÖ by Alkyone
Could Trump Trash The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?

Think of what the world would be like if Russia, the United States, China, India and Pakistan were testing nuclear weapons. They are not because of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which is responsible for shutting down nuclear testing by major and regional powers for more than two decades. Walking away from the CTBT would be extraordinarily dumb and dangerous, but the Trump administration has taken a step in this direction.

The CTBT was negotiated in 1996, but it isn't solidly in place. While Russia has signed and ratified it, Senate Republicans rejected it in 1999. China, like the United States, has signed but not ratified. There are other holdouts, including India and Pakistan. And yet none of these states has tested nuclear weapons since 1998. When a treaty is negotiated, it's common diplomatic practice not to undercut its objectives while awaiting its entry into force. Hence the two-decades-long moratorium on testing by every nuclear-armed state except North Korea.

How long this can this situation last? The answer is in doubt now that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr., has declared at a public forum that the "United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium." The Treaty sets a "zero yield" obligation: states aren't supposed to test even with the slightest yields. The State Department defines this as any explosion "that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction." In other words, you can conduct experiments, but the experiments should not produce any seismic activity.

As a result of General Ashley's statement, it's now open season against the CTBT for those who want to trash another treaty. Critics of arms control have begun to call on Donald Trump to "unsign" the CTBT, just as he has walked away from the Iran nuclear deal and the Arms Trade Treaty. (Trump also announced withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but in this case, evidence of Russian noncompliance is compelling.) By "unsigning" the CTBT, Trump would tell the world that the United States is no longer bound to respect the Treaty's obligation not to test nuclear weapons.

Before stumbling into this sinkhole, there are three very important things to bear in mind. First, the U.S. Intelligence Community in general, and the Defense Intelligence Agency in particular, have bad track records in assessing Moscow's compliance with nuclear testing constraints. Second, National Security Adviser John Bolton and others have a track record of fixing intelligence findings to fit their policy preferences, to the great detriment of America's national security, expeditionary forces, and international standing. And third, walking away from the CTBT would remove constraints on the resumption of nuclear testing by others far more than on the United States.

Now let's consider details.

General Ashley declared that the United States believes that Russia "probably" is cheating. This suggests an intelligence community-wide agreement, but Time magazine reports that this is not the case. According to Time's reporters, there is no consensus, and "the Defense Intelligence Agency generally takes the 'worst case' position on military matters." We deserve to know if there is a difference of view within the intelligence community on whether Russia is "probably" cheating, and if this dispute is about inference rather than evidence. We also need to know whether administration officials are seeking to influence intelligence assessments to suit policy preferences.

The Intelligence Community does not have a good track record when it comes to nuclear testing. In 1974, President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev agreed to a Threshold Test Ban Treaty, limiting tests underground to 150 kiloton yields -- about ten times that of the Hiroshima bomb. This treaty was much derided because the Left wanted a complete cessation of testing, while the Right presumed the treaty wasn't verifiable and that the Kremlin would cheat.

Sure enough, U.S. readings of Soviet tests indicated that the 150 kiloton-threshold was being breached, and this became part of the bill of particulars against doing new arms control agreements during the Reagan administration. The considered judgment of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency was that the Kremlin "likely" cheated.

This judgment was later disproven by joint verification experiments at the U.S. and Soviet test sites. The "evidence" used to declare a "likely" violation was faulty. Seismic monitoring capabilities were much cruder back then, and there were wide bands of uncertainty surrounding the actual yields of Soviet tests. Uncertainty levels were magnified further by a lack of understanding of the geology at Soviet test sites, resulting in the systematic overestimation by the U.S. intelligence community of Soviet nuclear test yields. With information based on the joint verification experiments, the issue of "likely" Soviet violations was put to rest.

Now fast-forward to General Ashley's claim of "probable" Russian violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban's zero yield stricture. Monitoring a zero yield treaty is much harder than monitoring whether a 150 kiloton-threshold has been exceeded. Very intrusive inspections -- the kind permitted by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- might help, but the Senate hasn't consented to the Treaty. Another set of joint verification experiments might once again prove useful, but Washington and Moscow have to improve ties before this can happen.

Even though the Comprehensive Test Ban hasn't entered into force, the United States, Russia, and many other signatories have wisely decided to set up an international monitoring system able to detect very low yield explosions. The head of this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has clarified that this ultra-sophisticated network of over 300 sensors, including several particularly useful to monitor the Russian test site located above the Arctic Circle, has not detected suspicious readings. The United States possesses a parallel monitoring network, which might be even better. We deserve to know whether it has recorded suspicious readings or not.

If it has not, what, then, might possibly account for the Defense Intelligence Agency's conclusion of a "probable" Russian violation of the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? The answer might well be inferences drawn from the refurbishment of Russia's Arctic test site, including the construction of new facilities. But the United States has also refurbished and built new facilities at its test site in Nevada where treaty-permissible experiments are carried out.

Is activity at the Arctic test site suggestive of noncompliance? The answer might well lie in the eye of the beholder. For the Defense Intelligence Agency, it's possible that suspicious activity and construction at Russia's test site is sufficient to conclude the probability of a violation.

If this is the case, it's not sound analysis; it's inference. Before the drums intensify to "unsign" the Test Ban Treaty, thereby opening the gates to renewed nuclear testing by one and all, the House Intelligence Committee could demonstrate that it's not totally consumed with Donald Trump's ties to Russia by calling witnesses and finding out what's behind the Defense Intelligence Agency's claim of a "probable" violation. What is fact and what is surmise? It might be true that the Kremlin has tested at yields that are extraordinarily hard to detect. Or it might be true that the assertion of a "probable" violation reflects shoddy intelligence tradecraft or political influence, or both. What's behind this judgment? The testimony would, of course, be classified, but the Committee could provide an unclassified summary of its findings.

It's unknown whether John Bolton had any involvement with the DIA intelligence assessment, but another reason for investigation is the National Security Adviser's record of  "fixing" intelligence to make the case for a second war against Saddam Hussein, a war predicated on weapons of mass destruction that did not exist. Bolton is on record opposing U.S. ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. Is he once again "fixing the facts" to suit his policy preferences? Is the Defense Intelligence Agency once again guilty of reaching conclusions beyond available evidence, and misrepresenting the evidence it has? Or is there strong evidence of Russian violations of the CTBT's prohibition on testing?

We deserve answers to these questions before opening the floodgates to resumed nuclear testing. Mesajı Paylaş
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Türkiye de nükleer şemsiyeden dışarı çıkmış görüntüde bir ülke şu an için. Atom bombası yapmamız şart. Politikamız atom bombasına 3 ay mesafede olma olarak şimdilik olmalı. Her türlü denetlemelere açık olarak ama herkesin de farkında olacağı düzeyde atom bombasına 3 ay uzakta hazırlığında olmamız gerek. İlk fırsatta da üretmemiz gerek ilerde tabi. Mesajı Paylaş


Why Russia and China Are Joining Forces

Russian and Chinese military aircraft probed South Korean and Japanese air defenses last week, leading the South Koreans to fire more than 300 warning shots before the intruders departed.

This was just the latest manifestation of a deepening alliance between Russia and China. James Dobbins, Howard Shatz and Ali Wyne described the emerging alignment in an April essay in the Diplomat. In 2016, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China's largest source of imported oil. In 2017, the two countries held their first joint naval exercise in the Baltic Sea. In June 2018, Xi Jinping called Vladimir Putin "my best, most intimate friend," and later that year Chinese forces participated in the largest military exercise on Russian soil since 1981.

The departing director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, says the two Eurasian supergiants are as close as they were in the 1950s. From Venezuela to Syria to Serbia, they are working to frustrate the West. They are also increasingly cooperating in sub-Saharan Africa and have found ways to reduce their competition in Central Asia.

Many analysts discounted the prospects for deep Sino-Russian coordination. Mr. Putin's overarching foreign policy objective has long been to build up Russia as an independent great power between Europe and China; a close alliance with a rising China works against this goal. Tensions along their lengthy border, commercial rivalries, and Russian suspicion of Chinese designs on its Far Eastern territories tend to drive the two countries apart. Given Russia's slow decline and China's rapid rise, some expected Russia would support Western efforts to balance China rather than undermine them.

Instead Moscow seems to have concluded that the door to the West is closed. The European Union is too weak, too indecisive and too liberal to serve as a strategic partner for Mr. Putin's Russia. President Trump is too mercurial and Congress too hostile for the U.S. to meet Russia's needs. That leaves a stark choice between an alliance with China and isolation.

There is another factor driving Moscow and Beijing together. The circus atmosphere of the Trump presidency sometimes obscures this, but the past few years have witnessed a marked increase in American power. Washington's reach is expanding, its ability to enforce its will on others has grown, and it has become more willing and able to use its power disruptively. Moreover, as recent protests in Moscow and Hong Kong demonstrate, liberal ideas still have the power to challenge the world's autocrats. Russia and China have decided to work together more closely in large part because both countries are more worried about the U.S.

Intelligent people disagree about the wisdom of the Trump administration's Iran policy, and success is far from certain--but as a demonstration of American power, the economic isolation of a major oil producer in the teeth of stiff European, Chinese and Russian opposition is an extraordinary spectacle. To Russia--another major oil producer dependent on trade with the West that has felt the bite of American sanctions--it is terrifying.

Three factors contribute to this surge in American power. First, the success of fracking and related technologies together with the increased use of renewable energy in the West makes world energy markets more resilient. Oil prices are stable and relatively low even though Iran and Venezuela have essentially been forced out of the market.

Second, the growing sophistication of information technology means that U.S. authorities can track complex transactions and enforce secondary sanctions to an unprecedented degree. European governments have been shocked to discover that they cannot protect national companies wishing to do business with Iran from American law. Moscow and Beijing cannot help but notice that these tools could one day be turned against them.

The third factor is Mr. Trump. By using trade and tariffs as weapons in unrelated negotiations, the president has increased America's clout. European efforts to resist U.S. sanctions on Iran, for example, must be carried out in the shadow cast by Mr. Trump's threats to impose massive tariffs on key European products on vaguely defined "national security" grounds.

Mr. Trump's critics argue that Washington can't afford to alienate longtime allies as adversaries coalesce against the U.S. They also warn that the institutions that constrained great-power competition are decaying at an accelerating pace. And businesses around the world need the kind of policy predictability that Trump-era diplomacy is steadily eroding.

True enough, and worrying--but the new world disorder has deeper causes than Mr. Trump. There are two rising great powers in the world today--not just one--and the U.S. as well as China is developing a more expansive view of its interests as its power grows.

China has responded to the newly competitive international situation by deepening its relationship with a strategic partner. Combine the jostling ambitions of two rising world powers with the disruptive economic, military and cultural consequences of the information revolution, and the causes of our distemper are easier to understand if not, unfortunately, to resolve. Mesajı Paylaş
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Sunday's US Missile Launch, Explained.

Arms Control Twitter has been abuzz since yesterday's announcement that the United States had conducted a surprise launch of a Tomahawk missile on Sunday afternoon.

This wasn't just your regular missile launch, however. It was a Tomahawk cruise missile launched from a ground-based Mark-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), traveling to a distance of "more than 500 kilometers," according to the Department of Defense.

In other words: a violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty--if the treaty still existed. It officially died on August 2nd, six months after both the United States and Russia announced suspensions of their respective treaty obligations. But the launch is an important walk-back of US security policy which for 32 years sought to curtail such weapons and instead, as we have written for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, makes the United States needlessly complicit in the INF's demise and frees Russia from both the responsibility and pressure to return to compliance.

The launch was a bit of a surprise, but we knew it was coming. As early as March, US defense officials announced that DoD would test two missiles after the treaty expired on August 2nd: a ground-launched Tomahawk in August and a ground-launched ballistic missile in November.

Although the US test isn't an official INF violation (because the treaty is dead), the timing and characteristics of the test itself has raised a few popular questions, which we will answer below:

The test took place only 16 days after INF died. That's awfully quick to develop this missile configuration--does it mean that the United States was secretly violating the treaty this entire time?

No. Sunday's test features an existing missile being launched from an existing missile launcher. It isn't exactly a difficult engineering feat to cobble this together on short notice.

In fact, one of the most interesting things about the video is the haphazard nature of the test itself. As pointed out by Michael Duitsman, it looks like the Pentagon simply bolted a VLS launcher to a semi-trailer, planted a giant American flag nearby, and launched.

Why is everyone so worked up about the launcher?

This is where things get really interesting. The Mk-41 VLS launcher that was used to launch the Tomahawk is the same type of launcher that would be used to launch SM-3 interceptors from Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense stations in Romania and Poland, once the latter station is completed.

For years, Russia has said that the US deployment of these ground-based Mk-41 VLS launchers to Europe constitutes an INF violation, because they could theoretically be used to launch Tomahawks over 500 kilometers. Legally speaking, this doesn't hold water--Article VII, paragraph 7 of the INF Treaty states that in order for a launcher to be considered in violation of the treaty, it must actually conduct a ground launch of a prohibited missile. Since this never happened while the INF Treaty was in force, the Mk-41 VLS launchers weren't in violation.

What's more, the United States has consistently stated that although Mk-41s can launch Tomahawks, the ones deployed in Romania and Poland cannot. In December 2017, the State Department announced that "The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System does not have an offensive ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile capability. Specifically, the system lacks the software, fire control hardware, support equipment, and other infrastructure needed to launch offensive ballistic or cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk."

Perhaps this is true, perhaps it isn't. But absent some kind of US transparency measure that offers visibility into the Aegis Ashore systems, Russia is forced to rely solely on an American promise. And for Putin, that's simply not going to cut it. That being said, it's also possible that no amount of transparency would ever have satisfied Putin, as his primary concern over Aegis Ashore appears to be directed at the general deployment of missile defenses in Europe, rather than their offensive potential.

So why did the United States do this test?

Both the timing and the nature of the test indicate that it's driven primarily by political--rather than strategic--considerations. In all likelihood, the Trump administration asked the Pentagon to conduct an INF-violating test under a very tight timeline, and the quickest option also happened to be the most controversial. Also, any chance to give the INF Treaty's corpse the middle finger is one that this administration will surely take.

Unfortunately, the test will almost certainly further entrench Russia's suspicions of US missile defense deployments in Europe as well as enable the Kremlin to paint the United States as the problem rather than Russia.

And China can now feel completely vindicated in its decision not to join arms control talks or limitations. After all, why would it do so when it has far fewer nuclear weapons than both Russia and the United States, or consider limiting its INF-range missiles when Russia, India, and now the United States, are all developing such weapons?

With this flight test, the Trump administration has placed the United States firmly in the group of nations that it previously criticized for developing INF-range weapons. Instead of seeking to build international pressure against INF-missile proliferation, the Trump administration has needlessly surrendered the legal and political high-ground the United States previously had, and has now become part of the problem. Mesajı Paylaş
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